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Abstract. A number of security systems, from Chip-and-PIN payment
cards to contactless subway and train tokens, as well as secure localiza-
tion systems, are vulnerable to relay attacks.
Encrypting the communication between the honest endpoints does not
protect against such attacks. The main solution that has been oﬀered to
date is distance bounding, in which a tightly timed exchange of challenges
and responses persuades the veriﬁer that the prover cannot be further
away than a certain distance. This solution, however, still won't say
whether the speciﬁc endpoint the veriﬁer is talking to is the intended one
or notit will only tell the veriﬁer whether the real prover is nearby.
Are there any alternatives? We propose a more general paradigm based
on multichannel protocols. Our class of protocols, of which distance
bounding can be modelled as a special case, allows a precise answer
to be given to the question of whether the unknown device in front of
the potential victim is a relaying attacker or the device with which the
victim intended to communicate.
We discuss several instantiations of our solution and point out the extent
to which all these countermeasures rely, often implicitly, on the alertness
of a honest human taking part in the protocol.
1 Introduction
In a relay attack, the victims are two honest parties acting respectively as a
prover (e.g. a door-opening token) and a veriﬁer (e.g. a door-mounted token
reader). In normal operation, when the prover (token) is authenticated by the
veriﬁer (door), the veriﬁer grants some privilege (the door opens).
During a relay attack4, a pair of communicating attackers splice themselves
in the communication channel between the two victims. One of the attackers
acts as a fake veriﬁer to the victim prover and the other acts as a fake prover
to the victim veriﬁer. When the victim veriﬁer issues a challenge, the attackers
relay it unchanged to the victim prover; and when the prover issues its response
to the original challenge, the attackers relay that too, unchanged, to the true
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veriﬁer. The outcome is that the victim veriﬁer grants the privilege to the fake
prover, who was accepted thanks to the credentials unknowingly provided by the
victim prover.
The honest participants5:
When a relay attack is taking place:
Even if the victim prover and veriﬁer share a secret unknown to the attack-
ers, they are still vulnerable: since their messages are relayed unchanged, the
attackers succeed in fooling the veriﬁer regardless of whether they can decrypt
the messages they relay.
This problem has been known for several decades: Conway [6] described the
chess grandmaster problem, in which an unskilled player defeats (or at least
draws with) a chess grandmaster by simultaneously challenging two grandmas-
ters at postal chess, one as white and one as black, and countering the moves
of one grandmaster with those of the other. Beth and Desmedt [2] revisited the
problem, noting that it matched the scenarios of the maﬁa fraud6 and terrorist
fraud7, both previously described by Desmedt et al. [8], and they introduced
5 We only show the essential core of the protocol here: clearly, in a more realistic
situation, one would expect the protocol to be initiated by a preliminary request from
Peter hey, please challenge me so I can prove I'm worthy of getting the beneﬁts.
We omit this and other non-essential messages for brevity and clarity.
6 In the maﬁa fraud, P is a customer who is electronically paying his restaurant bill to
MV . Restaurant owner MV is a member of a maﬁa gang who alerts his accomplice
MP to go and buy a diamond from jeweller V . Jeweller V challenges MP for his
credentials, but MP and MV relay P 's credentials to V . So P thinks he's paying
for a meal, whereas he is buying the maﬁosi a diamond.
7 In the terrorist fraud, the veriﬁer V is an immigration oﬃcer of country α and the
fake prover MP is a terrorist who wants to enter the country. The fake prover MP
is helped by P , a sympathetic citizen of α who supplies the correct answers to the
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the defensive technique of measuring the round-trip time, relying on the fact
that the speed of light is ﬁnite to detect whether the actual prover is further
away than expected. Brands and Chaum [3] reﬁned that technique into a speciﬁc
and more secure low-level protocol, with precomputation of single-bit challenges
and responses that are then exchanged as quickly as the channel allows. More re-
cently, Hancke and Kuhn [12] developed a distance-bounding protocol optimized
for the resource-constrained RFID environment and, with colleagues [5], studied
a variety of attacks on the timing measurements. Drimer and Murdoch [9] built
electronic circuitry to demonstrate the relay attack8 against modern Chip-and-
PIN bank cards and implemented the Hancke-Kuhn protocol to demonstrate
its viability as a practical countermeasure. Hancke's doctoral dissertation [11]
contains a good survey of the distance-bounding protocols in the literature.
The purpose of any distance-bounding protocol in such a context is to con-
vince the honest veriﬁer that the honest prover she is ultimately interacting with
(the one who can respond to the challenges, whereas the attackers can't because
they don't know the shared secret) is, with high probability, the prover currently
in front of her. By construction, the distance bounding protocol can only give
a verdict of the form the owner of the shared secret just proved that he is no
further away than d metres. If the veriﬁer is interacting with a prover (whether
genuine or fake) that is less than 1 metre away, but the distance bounding pro-
tocol says that he was unable to prove that he is within 10 metres, then the
veriﬁer should suspect that she is interacting with a relaying attacker.
Still, the distance-bounding solution does not really identify a speciﬁc prin-
cipal but only its approximate location9. At least theoretically, depending on
the spatial resolution of the distance-bounding protocol, it is still possible for
attackers to go undetected if they stay within the bounds of the error margin,
as in the scenario of multiple adjacent cash machines of which one is fake and
performs a relay attack on another.
In this paper we propose a new paradigm for detecting and preventing relay
attacks that is more general than distance bounding. Our strategy is to use a
multichannel protocol [20,15,4,18,16] in which the traditional challenge-response
between veriﬁer and prover on the regular channel is augmented with an addi-
tional veriﬁcation on a special channel whose main property is that it cannot be
relayed.
Our multichannel approach includes the distance-bounding solution as a spe-
cial case10. More importantly, our family of solutions includes ones that give a
questions of the immigration oﬃcer V . The main diﬀerence between this case and
the maﬁa fraud is that the prover P is not a victim of the scam but an accomplice:
he cooperates with the fake prover MP against the veriﬁer V and therefore there is
no need for a fake veriﬁer MV .
8 With explicit reference to the maﬁa fraud scenario.
9 Within a sphere, or within the intersection of several spheres in the substantially
more complicated case where one repeats the protocol from several reference points.
10 Insofar as you cannot relay beyond a certain distance the special channel implicitly
deﬁned by the distance-bounding procedure without being noticed by the victim
endpoints.
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clear and deﬁnite yes / no answer to the question is the principal in front of
me really the one with whom I share this secret key, or is it just a middleperson
attacker?, which the distance-bounding protocols can only answer with a less
stringent assurance such as it probably is, provided there are no other principals
within d metres of Victoria.
Our approach also models the anti-relay alternative proposed by Damgård
et al. [7] of somehow limiting the bandwidth with which the prover can com-
municate to the outside world to a value lower than the one needed in order to
conduct the protocoltheir arrangement implicitly relies on unrelayable chan-
nels because, by construction, at least one of the channels used in the protocol
cannot be relayed to third parties outside.
We also highlight the extent to which all these anti-relay protocols, including
both our new ones and the traditional ones based on distance bounding, implic-
itly rely on the presence of an honest human. We discuss whether they are still
secure when the human takes part in the protocol without actively cheating but
without thoroughly investigating all possible suspicious clues.
2 The core idea
Our core idea is that, although the man-in-the-middle attackers are usually able
to relay the information between the two honest endpoints over whatever chan-
nels are normally used for the transaction, we might be able to augment the
system with an additional special channel that the attackers won't be able to
relay. Over that channel, the two endpoints can verify whether they are talking
directly to each other or not.
Traditionally, the authentication problem11 can be framed in the following
terms: I know I am talking to you; now, prove to me that you know our shared
secret. Here, instead, we examine the dual problem: I know I am talking to
someone who knows my shared secret; now, prove to me that you, the principal
in front of me, are that someone.
The intuition behind the multichannel approach is that the veriﬁer asking
that question should use the special channel to sample some physical aspect of
the prover which the men in the middle are not able to relay, and then ask the
prover (assumed to be honest and cooperative) to say, even over the regular
channel subject to relay, what the correct value should be. Since prover and
veriﬁer already share a secret, they can use standard cryptographic techniques
to protect the integrity (and conﬁdentiality, though generally less relevant here)
of the regular relay-vulnerable channel, thereby preventing the fake prover from
replacing the true prover's model answer with one matching the fake prover's
own physical aspect.
11 According to our deﬁnition the authentication phase, which takes place repeatedly, is
distinct from the preliminary enrollment or pairing phase, performed only once
and under more controlled circumstances, in which the two principals establish a
common secret.
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Since the fake prover can't reproduce the true prover's physical aspect (by hy-
pothesis of unrelayability of the special channel) and can't substitute the prover's
description with his own (because the regular channel is integrity-protected by
the secret shared between the honest prover and veriﬁer), the veriﬁer can justi-
ﬁably deduce that the principal in front of it is the genuine prover if and only
if the value sampled directly over the special channel is consistent with the one
received over the integrity-protected channel. That's the core idea in a nutshell.
Looking at the problem in greater detail, the ﬁrst issue is to deﬁne more
precisely the unrelayability property, and the second is to clarify the subtle
interactions between humans and their digital representatives in the course of the
veriﬁcation process: how much of the veriﬁcation protocol can run unattended
and how much of it does instead implicitly rely on human vigilance? We wish to
make everything explicit.
Readers should note that using a multichannel protocol (such as acquiring a
2D barcode from a screen with a cellphone camera, as in the classic Seeing Is
Believing protocol [15]) does not, by itself, prevent relay attacks. Without elab-
orate precautions, the auxiliary channel could itself be relayed12, which would
totally negate its purpose. What we need is a multichannel protocol where one
of the channels is by design unrelayable.
3 Unrelayable channels and protocols that use them
Our investigation of unrelayable channels brings to mind the work by Pappu et
al. on unclonable physical one-way functions [17]:
These physical one-way functions are inexpensive to fabricate, prohibitively
diﬃcult to duplicate, admit no compact mathematical representation,
and are intrinsically tamper-resistant.
To implement an unrelayable channel we require similar properties. In the con-
text of a unidirectional channel in which a detector (sink) acquires information
by sampling some physical aspect of an emitter (source), we need:
weak unclonability: it must be prohibitively diﬃcult to produce a copy of a
given source13;
12 For example, the on-screen barcode that Peter acquires with his cellphone could
have been generated by Morivictoria by replicating the one acquired by Moripeter's
cellphone from Victoria's screen.
13 Some will claim that this property is redundant because it is implied by each of the
next two. But it is conceptually diﬀerent and therefore we mention it as distinct
to clarify the issues involved. By analogy, think of the source as a walnut. Weak
unclonability means the attacker can't produce another identical walnut. Strong un-
clonability means it's infeasible for the attacker to produce any two walnuts that are
indistinguishable. Unsimulability means the attacker can't fool you by just showing
you a photograph of your walnut.
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strong unclonability: it must be prohibitively diﬃcult to manufacture two
indistinguishable sources14;
unsimulability: it must be prohibitively diﬃcult to fool the sink by simulating
the response of the genuine source using some other device15;
untransportability: it must be prohibitively diﬃcult to manufacture a data
pipe device capable of transporting to another location L the output of the
source with suﬃcient ﬁdelity that a sink at location L would not be able to
distinguish whether it is sampling the genuine source or the output of the
data pipe.
The unsimulability and untransportability requirements highlight the neces-
sity of looking at the whole system, not just the source and sink endpoint de-
vices, and of including the whole veriﬁcation process in the evaluation. We must
in particular clarify whether we are implicitly relying on the presence of a human
veriﬁer (e.g. to check that what is being sampled is the genuine artifact rather
than, say, a box of electronics that simulates it, or a set of mirrors and prisms
that reproduce its appearance) and the extent to which the overall unrelayabil-
ity property depends on the care with which the human helper supervises the
veriﬁcation.
To help the reader follow the discussion, we shall now present several exam-
ples of unrelayable channels and associated protocols. They are not meant to be
adopted as they are: take them as illustrations whose purpose is to help us think
about the required properties of an acceptable solution.
To simplify matters, we deal with unidirectional authentication, with one
prover and one veriﬁer16. Prover and veriﬁer are connected by a regular bidirec-
tional channel, subject to relay attacks, and by a special unrelayable channel,
which is unidirectional and goes from prover to veriﬁer. The two principals have
previously performed the pairing phase and therefore share a secret with which,
using well-known cryptographic techniques, they can make the regular channel
conﬁdential and integrity-protected. Notation-wise, in the rest of this paper we
shall say lock X with K, written as LK(X), to mean cryptographically protect
both the integrity and the conﬁdentiality of X using K as the key, for example
with encrypt-then-MAC.
With reference to our earlier ﬁgures, prover Peter must prove to veriﬁer
Victoria that the principal to whom Victoria is talking (and of whom Victoria can
14 This would be analogous to a cryptographic collision. As with collision resistance,
this clonability resistance property is stronger than the previous one, which it im-
plies: if an attacker can't make two identical sources of his own choice then a fortiori
he can't make a copy of a designated target source.
15 This property, too, implies the ﬁrst one: if the attacker can't simulate the designated
source using another device then a fortiori he can't make a clone of it.
16 We believe that what we really want in most practical applications is mutual au-
thentication. For the moment, ignore possible optimizations and assume you can
achieve mutual authentication by running the unidirectional protocol twice, once
in each direction. Note however that this glosses over some subtle issues about the
incentives of the two parties. We shall discuss them at the end of section 3.1.
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physically observe/measure/probe some physical aspect over the special channel)
is Peter, i.e. the same principal that shares the secret with her. The attacker
model is still that man-in-the-middle Moriarty has recruited two accomplices,
Moripeter who looks like Peter and will try to fool Victoria, and Morivictoria who
looks like Victoria and will try to fool Peter. Victoria wins if she can distinguish
whether the principal to whom she is directly talking is Peter (who shares a
secret with her) or Moripeter (who doesn't). Conversely Moriarty wins if, after
placing Moripeter next to Victoria, and Morivictoria next to Peter, he persuades
Victoria that she is talking directly to Peter, even though she really isn't.
Normally, Victoria would run some kind of challenge-response protocol; she
could for example ask Peter (or Moripeter, since she can't tell the diﬀerence
yet) a question such as: Here is a random nonce N . What do you obtain if you
lock it with our shared secret KPV ?. But, with a relay attack, Moripeter would
relay the question to Morivictoria, who would ask the same question to Peter,
who would provide the correct answer; then Moripeter would get the correct
answer from Morivictoria and repeat it to Victoria, who would then be fooled
into thinking that Moripeter knew the secret KPV , whereas he didn't (and still
doesn't).
3.1 Example: banknote
In this ﬁrst example, Peter's unrelayable physical characteristic is a banknote.
The banknote is, by design, prohibitively diﬃcult to duplicate (yielding weak
and strong unclonability), and there are well-established methods for verifying
that it is not a forgery.
Victoria now says, to the principal in front of her (Moripeter if they are
under attack, or Peter under normal circumstances): Give me a banknote.17
She checks that it's not a forgery (thereby reassuring herself that it is unclonable
and that no duplicates of it exist) and then reads its serial number S and burns
the banknote, making sure that that particular serial number will never be used
again in any other run of this protocol18. Then she asks: What do you obtain
when you lock S, the serial number of the banknote you gave me, with our shared
secret KPV ?
How can Moripeter answer that question? He could tell the serial number
S to Morivictoria if it helped, but Morivictoria must run with Peter the same
protocol as Victoria did with Moripeter (otherwise Peter would not respond), so
she must ask for a banknote of that type from Peter, which will have a diﬀerent
serial number, say S2. Peter will lock that S2 with the shared secret and there
is no way that Morivictoria can persuade him to lock S instead, since
17 The banknote must be of a well-speciﬁed currency, issue and denomination, to avoid
substitution attacks. To minimize the cost of each run of the protocol, it is OK for the
banknote to be almost worthlesse.g. one from a country with runaway inﬂation
provided it is still unclonable. Alternatively, one might use the same technology as
banknote printing to create low-value tickets with similar unclonability properties,
as is sometimes done for concert or public transport tickets.
18 Burning the banknote at each protocol run makes S a nonce.
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 the banknote is chosen by Peter; and, anyway,
 no other banknote exists with S on it: the only one that did was burnt.
So Moripeter will not be able to answer correctly and Victoria will be able to
tell that she received the banknote from someone who didn't know the secret.
Attack: reverse pickpocketing Now here is an attack: Moripeter and Moriv-
ictoria take a genuine banknote and make a counterfeit copy of it. The forgery
is as good as it gets, but it is (by hypothesis of weak unclonability) detectable
by someone who runs the proper checks. But, crucial point: Peter is the prover,
not the veriﬁer, so why should he be running any serious checks (UV light,
colour-changing marker etc etc)? Do you do that on the banknotes you get from
your cash machine, or as change from the supermarket? So the scam is for the
Moriarty associates to give the forged banknote to Peter (as change in a trans-
action, or by letting him ﬁnd it on the ﬂoor, or by reverse pickpocketing him,
or whatever) and ensure that he will use it in the subsequent protocol run (no
guarantee, but still non-negligible probability). The full run then goes as follows.
Victoria asks Moripeter for a banknote. He gives her the genuine banknote,
with serial number S. She asks him to lock S with the shared secret KPV ,
which Moripeter doesn't know. Morivictoria asks Peter for a banknote. With
some probability, she gets back the forged banknote that has the same serial
number S: Peter didn't check very carefully and never realized he had a forged
banknote19 so he thinks he is handing over a genuine one. Morivictoria asks
Peter to lock with KPV the serial number of the banknote he just handed over;
he obliges, and Morivictoria obtains LKPV (S) which she relays to Moripeter who
can then correctly answer Victoria's challenge and pass oﬀ as Peter.
The lesson here is: who should be verifying the genuineness of the banknote?
The prover or the veriﬁer? And the correct answer is: both! If either of them
doesn't check with suﬃcient care, an attack is possible. (NB: if Victoria does
not check that she is receiving a genuine banknote, the dual of the above scam,
where Moripeter gives Victoria the forged banknote, works equally well.)
This attack scenario also highlights another systems issue we mentioned be-
fore: to what extent are we relying on humans to perform additional implicit
sanity checks? Is it possible for the protocol to run with one machine talking to
another machine, in unattended fashion20? Assume the crooked machine might
exhibit a relaying artifact, e.g. a hi-res screen displaying the banknote, rather
than the genuine article. In this case we see that we could in theory run this
variant of the protocol in a machine-to-machine setting, provided that both the
prover and the veriﬁer contained the approved vending-machine-style technolo-
gies for checking that a banknote is not a forgery. Conversely, if we ran this
19 And if Peter vaguely suspected it was a forgery, he was probably happy to get rid of
it by using it in a protocol where it will be destroyed and none will be the wiser
that's an interesting observation about the role of dishonesty in the psychology of
scam victims [19] but let's not get sidetracked for the moment.
20 Imagine for example a car interacting with a barrier, to enter a restricted zone or to
pay a road toll or parking charge.
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protocol as person-to-machine (a human entering a high-security facility, or a
human using an ATM), then it would fall upon the human to perform as careful
a check of the authenticity of the banknote as the machine will do. In other
words: we do indeed also need unsimulability and untransportability, as well as
the strong and weak unclonability that we got from using a banknote!
Attack: not burning the banknote Here is another possible attack. Moriv-
ictoria asks Peter for a banknote, which he gives her. She pretends to burn it
but instead she secretly passes it on to Moripeter. She also asks Peter to lock
the serial number with KPV , and she gives that answer to Moripeter as well.
Now Moripeter can fool Victoria, using the genuine banknote and the LKPV (S)
kindly supplied by Peter! To prevent this, we must prevent Morivictoria from
being able to reuse the banknote in other runs of the protocol. For example
we could say she must cut it in half and return it to Peter21, all strictly under
Peter's nose22. The interesting problem, here, again, is that the strength of this
countermeasure depends on the care with which Peter checks that he received
the two halves of the same genuine banknote that he originally suppliedand
not, for example, the two halves of a forgery, or of another banknote. But what's
Peter's incentive for performing this check? If he is careless and the Moriarty
associates succeed in their scam, they are fooling Victoria into opening her door
(or giving away her diamond, or whatever) to Moripeter; does Peter lose any-
thing? Not straight away, unless there are external liability issues that penalize
Peter for fraudulent use of his authentication credentials. At the baseline level,
though, it is Victoria's security (not Peter's) that depends on the care exercised
by Peter, and this should be considered a vulnerability. Even though Peter is
not actively dishonest, he may not go out of his way in order to protect Victoria,
so long as he doesn't lose anything himself by being slightly careless.
This attack scenario explains why we might want to develop a mutual authen-
tication protocol in which the fate of the two parties is more closely entangled
than it would be by simply running two instances of the unidirectional authen-
tication protocol one after the other. The reason for wanting a mutual protocol
is not to optimize and save on number of messages but rather to bind the incen-
tives of the participants, so that if one of them is sloppy and the other careful
then neither gets any beneﬁt from the protocol run (as opposed to the unfair
situation in which the sloppy principal is rewarded/protected because the other
was careful, and the careful principal suﬀers because the other was sloppy).
21 Returning the ashes isn't as good, because Morivictoria might supply the ashes of
another banknote and Peter would not be able to notice.
22 Otherwise another attack would be for Morivictoria to receive the banknote, go to
the kitchen to fetch some scissors, pass Peter's note to Moripeter who would then run
the protocol by having it cut by the real Victoria; the two halves would be returned
by Victoria to Moripeter, then to Morivictoria pretending to have just returned from
the kitchen, then to Peter and neither Peter nor Victoria would be the wiser.
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3.2 Example: accelerometers
In this rather diﬀerent example, Peter and Victoria have 3D accelerometers that
can record, at suitable resolution, a log of the accelerations to which they are
subjected. The accelerometers are stuck together and shaken randomly23 and
Victoria checks that the prover could observe the shake. The idea behind this is
that a random shake is unclonable. The protocol runs as follows.
Victoria says: Give me your accelerometer. Here is mine, too. I stick them
together and shake them randomly for x seconds. Now have your accelerometer
back. Please lock its log with our common secret and send it back to me.
Attack: robotic arm To comply with this request, Moripeter could observe
Victoria's shake (the challenge) with his accelerometer, give the precise details
to Morivictoria from the accelerometer's log and have Morivictoria reproduce
that shake precisely in front of Peter. This last part is practically impossible
for a person to do, hence our claim above that a random shake is unclonable.
But what if Morivictoria has a high precision robotic arm that can reproduce
the shake to within the required tolerances? Then Peter's accelerometer would
record a shake equivalent to that originally performed by Victoria, and Peter
would lock it with the secret, and the Moriarty accomplices would win. So this
highlights an implicit dependency on Peter being an alert human who would
spot something amiss if Morivictoria's arm were not of ﬂesh and bones. (But
would he actually pay attention to that detail? What if the arm were covered in
clothes and appeared to come out of Morivictoria's shoulder?) Thus a machine-
to-machine version would not prevent relay attacks.
Attack: substituting, or tampering with, the accelerometer Morivic-
toria could, by sleight of hand, substitute Peter's accelerometer with one into
which she downloaded the log communicated to her by Moripeter. No need for
robotic arm, but the eﬀect is again that of giving Peter a relayed log instead
of the one of the real performance. To guard against this, Peter must ensure
that the accelerometer he gets back is really his, and also that it hasn't been
tampered with (otherwise Morivictoria could upload the relayed log into Peter's
own accelerometer). Once again we raise the warning that we may be relying
implicitly on the vigilance of a human Peter and that substitution or tampering
might be possible in a machine-to-machine transaction.
Cameras instead of accelerometers An alternative might be to monitor the
shake with cameras, rather than accelerometers, the intention being that Pe-
ter's cameras will never leave Peter's trusted computing base and Morivictoria
23 The technique of shaking together two objects instrumented with accelerometers was
ﬁrst proposed by Holmquist et al. [13] in the context of device pairing for ubiqui-
tous computing. Later papers [14] perfected the necessary authentication protocols,
taking into account error correction and so on.
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won't be able to tamper with them. Victoria would then say, without refer-
ence to accelerometers: I'll shake the tip of my ﬁnger randomly for x seconds.
Please lock the log of the 3D position of my ﬁnger with our common secret
and send it back to me. Setting aside the interesting but not security-critical
computational geometry problem of comparing shake traces taken from diﬀerent
viewpoints, this solution would guard against the last two attacks (substitute
Peter's accelerometer with one containing relayed log and upload relayed log
into Peter's accelerometer) but would still be subject to the Morivictoria uses
robotic arm attack.
3.3 Example: physical one-way functions
For this third example we use an instance of Pappu's physical one-way function:
a physical object with submicron features that are diﬃcult to replicate exactly
and that gives unpredictable but consistent responses when challenged (il-
luminated) with a laser. Peter holds the object (or is the objectthink iris
recognition) and Victoria challenges it. The protocol runs as follows.
Victoria shines her laser (in a random way R chosen by her, dictating pa-
rameters such as laser frequency, angle, scanning pattern etc) at Peter's POWF
object and she records the outcome OPeter(R). Then she tells Peter: What is
the response of your object when illuminated with R? Lock the response under
our secret and send it to me..
How can Moripeter answer that question? He will also have a POWF object,
but by hypothesis of unclonability it must be diﬀerent from Peter's. Victoria
records OMoripeter(R) and expects LK(OMoripeter(R)) but the Moriarty asso-
ciates can only produce either LK(OPeter(R)), which has the wrong plaintext
inside the outer brackets, or L???(OMoripeter(R)), where the correct plaintext is
known but the correct key to lock it is unknown to Moriarty.
Attack: smoke and mirrors In practice, the Moriarty associates could try to
fool Victoria by having Moripeter use a more complex smoke-and-mirrors piece of
machinery with its own lasers instead of a regular POWF object. Victoria chooses
the laser parameters R and the Moriarty associates, through relay, use these same
parameters to interrogate Peter's genuine POWF. They record the response
OPeter(R) and then make Moripeter's smoke-and-mirrors machine respond with
OPeter(R), rather than with anything physically generated, to Victoria's laser
challenge. Then Morivictoria asks Peter to lock the response with K, and she
relays that to Moripeter, who convinces Victoria with an LK(OPeter(R)) that
matches both the shared secret K and the response observed by Victoria.
The two assumptions upon which this attack is predicated are: ﬁrst, that the
Moriarty associates can build a smoke-and-mirrors machine capable of returning
arbitrarily chosen laser responses regardless of the laser challenge with which
it is illuminated; and second, that Victoria will just shine her laser in the pre-
scribed way without noticing that she is interacting with a smoke-and-mirrors
machine rather than with a POWF object. The ﬁrst of these assumptions is fairly
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technology-dependent: it concerns the possibility of mounting a speciﬁc techni-
cal attack against a speciﬁc implementation. The second, instead, is once again
related to the issue of whether a careful human supervisor will be overseeing the
protocol or not24.
It should also be noted that in practice the attack is much harder than we
casually described because Moripeter won't know Victoria's laser parameters R
until Victoria actually shines the laser. There is no reason for Victoria to disclose
R to the prover before shining the laser. If Victoria only discloses R after having
received a laser response from the prover, then Moripeter must perform all of
the following diﬃcult tasks:
 ﬁguring out R from the way Victoria shines the laser (instead of being told)
 reproducing those parameters at Morivictoria's end to challenge Peter
 obtaining Peter's POWF response
 relaying that back to Moripeter's smoke-and-mirrors machine
all in real time while Victoria is still operating. If the delay in Moripeter's an-
swer makes Victoria suspicious then this is reminiscent of distance-bounding
techniques (all essentially based on measuring whether the response takes longer
than would be reasonable), even though conceptually we are still in a diﬀerent
territory. Note that it is very technology-dependent whether it is possible to (a)
extract R while Victoria operates her laser and (b) relay the response piecemeal
as it unwinds, rather than atomically at the end.
Note that we are now not really discussing the protocol: we are discussing
whether or not the proposed special channel has the required unsimulability
property.
3.4 Example: quantum channel (polarized photons)
This fourth example is even less practical than the previous ones but it is con-
ceptually interesting, since it is based on the inherent unclonability of quantum
mechanical states. We leave quantum mechanics to theoretical physicists and we
just accept as a black box the assumptions (summarized in the next paragraph)
of the BB84 Quantum Key Exchange protocol [1].
Under the assumptions of BB84, Alice the sender can emit photons at vari-
ous polarization angles that are pairwise orthogonal (say 0, 45, 90, 135 degrees).
Her encoding of 0s and 1s into these polarizations is important for BB84 but
irrelevant for us. Bob the receiver cannot detect all the potential angles of the
incoming photon: he must ﬁrst choose one of two baseseither the rectilinear
one that can distinguish between 0 and 90, or the diagonal one that can distin-
guish between 45 and 135. If he measures an incoming photon using a base that
does not match the photon's polarization (for example measuring a 90-degree
24 Note that will be overseeingor, better, is responsible for overseeingis quite
diﬀerent from simply will be present; in most cases a human will indeed be present,
if nothing else to insert the card in the slot, but what matters here is whether the
strength of the protocol depends on the degree of care that the human will exercise.
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photon using the diagonal base), he will get an incorrect result (either 45 or 135,
randomly). The photon is modiﬁed by the measurement; so, if eavesdropper Eve
listens in on a photon with the wrong base, she spoils it for Bob.
We emphasize that we are not using (or describing) the BB84 protocol at
allonly its underlying physical transmission medium. The BB84 protocol is for
building a shared key between Alice and Bob, whereas in our scenario Victoria
and Peter already share a key before we even start.
Our protocol runs as follows. Victoria produces a suitably long random string
of the symbols {0, 45, 90, 135} and a matching string of the corresponding
polarization bases. She sends the second string (of bases) to Peter, locking it
with the shared secret25, and then she sends Peter the actual polarized photons
as described in the ﬁrst string, which Peter can decode correctly by using the
bases in the sequence he just received. Then it's Peter's job to send Victoria the
string of values he read out, again locked with the shared secret. If Moripeter
and Morivictoria splice themselves in, then when Moripeter listens to Victoria's
photons he must choose a polarization base to receive each photon, but he won't
know the right one because he could not unlock the ﬁrst message, so he'll get
it wrong about half the time and won't be able to tell Morivictoria the correct
sequence of photons to retransmit to Peter. Therefore Peter will lock a diﬀerent
sequence of values and, even if they relay that, Victoria will be able to distinguish
Peter from Moripeter.
Attack: relay the photons An attack here would be for the Moriarty asso-
ciates to run an optical ﬁbre that shipped Victoria's photons to Peter, without
being detected by either. If this were technically feasible, then the channel would
lack the required property of untransportability and would not be suitable. How-
ever we are as usual assuming that Victoria is suﬃciently alert that this attack
cannot be mounted without attracting her attention: she would hopefully notice
that (Mori)Peter has an extra optical ﬁbre sticking out of the back of his coat.
Attack: extract the challenge An over-elaborate and improbable attack
sees Morivictoria use Peter as an oracle to check Morivictoria's guess of Vic-
toria's locked sequence of bases. Victoria sends the locked sequence of bases to
Moripeter. Morivictoria brute-forces it by trying each possible guess on Peter in
turn, as described later. Once she has the correct guess about the bases she gives
it to Moripeter, who uses to decode the real photons from Victoria. Morivicto-
ria then sends the same sequence of photons to Peter, who provides the correct
locked answer that they can relay to Victoria. (To check each guess, Morivic-
toria repeatedly sends Peter the same sequence of photons, polarized along the
guessed base sequence; if the responses diﬀer, then the guess was wrong, else the
guess is shortlisted. She proceeds until only one guess is left.)
This attack relies on (a) the sequence being short enough that brute-forcing
won't require years or millennia, (b) Victoria being patient enough to wait for
25 Note that here we are using conﬁdentiality, not just integrity.
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the brute-force to take place between her ﬁrst and second message, and (c) Peter
being gullible enough to run the protocol as many times as requested without
suspecting anything. It can be thwarted by having Peter include a nonce inside
his locked answer so that it is diﬀerent every time even if the sequence of values
is the same26.
3.5 Example: quantum channel (entangled photons)
The other seminal quantum cryptography protocol, E91 [10], uses a diﬀerent
underlying mechanism for quantum key establishment: an entangled pair of pho-
tons. This mechanism, too, can be used to build another protocol in our family.
Under the assumptions of E9127, some external source can prepare pairs of
entangled photons and send one photon of the pair to Alice and one to Bob.
Each photon can be measured using either a blue or a red machine and the
outcome will be either 0 or 1. If Alice and Bob measure the two photons of an
entangled pair using same-coloured machines, the outcomes will be the same; if
they measure them with diﬀerently-coloured machines, they will be unrelated.
Once again, we are not describing or using the E91 protocoljust its physical
assumptions.
Our protocol runs as follows. Victoria generates n pairs of entangled pho-
tons and sends one photon from each pair to her correspondent (either Peter
or Moripetershe doesn't know yet, but with our protocol she will be able to
tell). Then Victoria sends Peter, over the standard channel, a random string of
{red, blue} symbolsone for each of the entangled photons. Peter must then
measure each photon with the machine of the speciﬁed colour and communicate
the result to Victoria over the standard channel. Victoria performs the same
measurements on her own photons and checks whether they match, which they
should if there is no man in the middle.
In case of relay attack, Moripeter won't be able to obtain the challenge
string of reds and blues and therefore won't be able to perform the correct
measurements even though he has the genuine photons that are entangled with
Victoria's. Meanwhile Peter, who can perform the prescribed measurements,
will be doing so on photons that are entangled with those of Morivictoria, not
of Victoria, and therefore his answers won't match those of Victoria, who will
detect the diﬀerence.
Note how easy it is to specify and describe a protocol that won't work, even if
we can rely on seemingly all-powerful unclonable features such as entangled pho-
tons. Victoria generates n pairs of entangled photons and sends one from each
pair to Peter. Then she also sends Peter, over the locked channel, a challenge
consisting of a string of randomly chosen red and blue symbols. Peter must mea-
sure the entangled bits using machines of the prescribed colours and then report
26 Of course this relies on the cryptographic implementation of locking not leaking
information about the fact that two ciphertexts might correspond to plaintexts that
share a long common portion.
27 Or rather its simpliﬁed description, by Ekert himself, at http://pass.maths.org.
uk/issue35/features/ekert/2pdf/index.html/op.pdf.
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the answers to Victoria over the locked channel. But here the Moriarty associates
relay the challenge from Victoria to Peter, let Peter do the measurements, relay
the measurements from Peter to Victoria and appear indistinguishable from the
case in which Peter answered directly.
Could you spot the subtle diﬀerence between this (broken) protocol and the
almost identical one that instead works? Stop reading if you haven't. . . In the
working protocol, Victoria sends the photons to the guy in front of her; in the
broken one, she sends them to Peter28.
Note that the relay the photons attack (cfr 3.4) applies to this setting as
well, with the same caveats.
3.6 Why our multichannel approach works
The key insight of our approach is that the standard channel (think radio) con-
nects Victoria to Peter (even if she doesn't know where he really is) and that
the special unrelayable channel connects Victoria to the principal in front of her.
Victoria challenges Peter over the standard channel and Peter issues conceptu-
ally the same response over both channels. The Moriarty associates can only
get it right on one channel at a time (they can relay the standard channel or
they can prove presence over the unrelayable channel29) but they can't issue
a consistent response over both. All the protocols shown so far are variations of
this principle.
4 Conclusions and further work
We presented a novel paradigm: a family of multichannel protocols featuring a
special channel that is unrelayable. We discussed the properties of unrelayable
channels and illustrated possible channels and protocols with imaginative (if
not always realistic) examples, chosen to explore the subtleties of the possi-
ble attacks, including the crucial role of the human principal in checking for
unexpected hardware. We trust readers will recognize this framework as a con-
ceptually new approach to developing protocols that prevent relay attacks.
What we need next is one or more robust and practical implementations of
the unrelayable channel, using appropriate physical phenomena and transduc-
ers, and suitable protocols from this family to accompany them. Another useful
contribution would be a formal analysis of the properties of these protocols.
We see great potential in this new line of authentication protocol research and
hope that others will join us in bringing it to fruition for real-world applications.
28 The broken protocol is thus also impossible to implement: Victoria doesn't know
which principal is Peter (whole purpose of protocol); so how could she send him the
photons?
29 . . . which, for all its wonderful properties, does not need to be particularly versatile:
for example, you may not even be able to choose what bits the source will transmit!
Multichannel protocols to prevent relay attacks 19
References
1. C. Bennett and G. Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public-key distribution and
coin tossing. Proc IEEE ICCSSP, 1984.
2. T. Beth and Y. Desmedt. Identiﬁcation Tokens  or: Solving the Chess Grand-
master Problem. Proc CRYPTO 90, LNCS 537.
3. S. Brands and D. Chaum. Distance-Bounding Protocols. Proc EUROCRYPT 93,
LNCS 765.
4. B. Christianson and J. Li. Multi-channel Key Agreement using Encrypted Public
Key Exchange. Proc Security Protocols Workshop 2007, LNCS 5964.
5. J. Clulow, G. Hancke, M. Kuhn and T. Moore. So Near and Yet So Far: Distance-
Bounding Attacks in Wireless Networks. Proc ESAS 2006, LNCS 4357.
6. J. Conway. On numbers and games. Academic Press, 1976.
7. Ivan Damgård, Jesper Buus Nielsen and Daniel Wichs. Isolated Proofs of Knowl-
edge and Isolated Zero Knowledge. Proc. EUROCRYPT 2008, LNCS 4965.
8. Y. Desmedt, C. Goutier and S. Bengio. Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-
Shamir Passport Protocol. Proc CRYPTO 87, LNCS 293.
9. S. Drimer and S. Murdoch. Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against
smartcard relay attacks. Proc USENIX Security 2007.
10. A. Ekert. Quantum cryptography based on Bell's theorem. Physical Review
Letters, 67(6):661+, 1991.
11. G. Hancke. Security of proximity identiﬁcation systems. Tech. Rep. 752, Univer-
sity of Cambridge, 2009.
12. G. Hancke and M. Kuhn. An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol. Proc IEEE
Securecomm '05.
13. L. Holmquist, F. Mattern, B. Schiele, P. Alahuhta, M. Beigl and H. Gellersen.
Smart-Its Friends: A Technique for Users to Easily Establish Connections between
Smart Artefacts. Proc UbiComp '01, LNCS.
14. R. Mayrhofer and H. Gellersen. Shake well before use: Intuitive and Secure Pairing
of Mobile Devices. IEEE Trans Mobile Computing, 8(6):792806, 2009.
15. J. McCune, A. Perrig and M. Reiter. Seeing-Is-Believing: Using Camera Phones
for Human-Veriﬁable Authentication. Proc IEEE Security and Privacy 2005.
16. L. Nguyen and A. Roscoe. Authentication protocols based on low-bandwidth
unspoofable channels: a comparative survey, 2009 (manuscript).
17. R. Pappu, B. Recht, J. Taylor and N. Gershenfeld. Physical One-Way Functions.
Science, 297(5589):20262030, 2002.
18. D. Pavlovic and C. Meadows. Deriving Authentication for Pervasive Security.
Proc ACM ISTPS 2008.
19. F. Stajano and P. Wilson. Understanding scam victims: seven principles for sys-
tems security. Tech. rep. 754, University of Cambridge, 2009.
20. F. Wong and F. Stajano. Multi-channel Protocols. Proc Security Protocols Work-
shop 2005, LNCS 4631. See also the extended and revised version in IEEE Pervasive
Computing 6(4):3139, 2007.
